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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1960's and the 1970's, the question of economic de-
velopment in the Third World became increasingly politicized. In devel-
oping countries demands for economic autonomy increased causing these
nations to become less hospitable to direct foreign investment.
In large part, this change resulted from the perception that the inter-
ests of foreign-controlled multinational enterprises (MNE's) were often
inconsistent with the priorities and goals of the host nation. The mere
presence of MNE's was no longer perceived as a positive contribution to
economic development. Often their influence made it more difficult for
host nations to design and enforce national policies.' Various groups be-
gan to demand that foreign investment be restricted. Such restriction
was deemed necessary either for national security reasons, with regard to
certain sectors of the economy, or because MNB's were perceived to have
an unfair competitive advantage over domestic enterprises, thereby stunt-
ing domestic enterprise growth.2 In order to maintain their legitimacy
and stay afloat amid domestic political struggles, host nation govern-
ments began to adopt a more critical attitude toward direct foreign in-
1. Foreign corporations are often unwilling to invest in key heavy industries or infra-
structure where capital requirements are high and rates of return low. See Frieden, Third
World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico. Bra-
zil, Algeria, and South Korea, 35 INT'L ORG. 407, 412 (1981); Damino, Regulating the M[ul-
tinational: A Note on the Divestment Myth, 10 LAW. OF THE AM. 385, 386-89 (1978); Oliver,
The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for a Normative Order as to
Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972).
2. See Frieden, supra note 1, at 412. For a discussion of the formation of nationalist
bourgeois coalitions which advocate discriminatory national policies to favor national firms,
see Dominguez, Business Nationalism; Latin American National Business Attitudes and Behav-
ior toward Multinational Enterprises, in ECONOMIC IssUEs AND POLITICAL CONFLICT:
UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS (J. Dominguez ed. 1982).
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vestments. This took the form of restrictions on the structure and
operations of MNE's, divestitures, and expropriations.3
Faced with an equally strong need for economic growth, however,
developing nations were reluctant to forego foreign investment alto-
gether. They turned to indirect foreign investment; bank loans were
channeled through the public sector and used to establish or expand do-
mestically controlled enterprises, both private and public. Indirect for-
eign investment was a politically more acceptable alternative to direct
investment. It represented increased control over the use of capital to
ensure that it promoted development goals and it did not increase the
foreign competition faced by nascent domestic industries.4 In Latin
America, private financial institutions have replaced multinational cor-
porations and official aid as the most important source of foreign capital,
increasing from ten percent in the 1960's to fifty-seven percent in the
1970's.5
As a consequence of heavy borrowing from foreign banks, many de-
veloping countries now have serious debt repayment problems and for-
eign exchange deficiencies. This problem reached crisis proportions in
Mexico in 1982 and in Argentina in 1984. And although Cuba is in quite
a different position vis-A-vis direct foreign investment, it has also relied
heavily on foreign borrowing. As a result, Cuba now faces similar
shortages of hard currency reserves with which to service its foreign
debt.
6
In an effort to ease reliance on commercial borrowing, developing
nations are once again looking to direct foreign investment as a source of
necessary capital. The attitude of foreign investors, however, has
changed. Having experienced considerable hostility and instability in
host nations over the past two decades, investors from industrialized na-
tions have grown more cautious. Calls for clear investment guidelines,
guarantees of economic obligations, and access to an international body
3. Statistical studies indicate that among other factors influencing the probability that a
nation will nationalize or expropriate foreign-owned operations is an increase in the degree of
political turmoil within a country. In part this was interpreted to be an effort to maintain
power by maintaining legitimacy in the face of domestic protests against foreign enterprises,
Jodice, Sources of Change in Third World Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment, 1968-1976,
34 INT'L ORG. 177 (1980). See generally D. SMITH & L. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD
WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS 15-18 (1975).
4. See Dominguez, supra note 2, at 26.
5. See also Frieden, supra note 1, at 407.
6. As of 1982, Cuba is reported to have a $2.6 billion foreign debt, $1.7 billion of which
was owed to Western commercial banks. See Theriot, Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of
the 1980's, reprinted in JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., EAST-WEST TRADE:
THE PROSPECTS TO 1985, at 109 (Comm. Print 1982).
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for dispute settlement are frequent.7
Given this atmosphere, governments of developing nations face the
problem of balancing the need to attract foreign investors with the desire
to maintain control over national economic development. At the same
time, the United States government has become directly involved in cre-
ating what it considers a favorable investment climate abroad. Notable
among United States efforts is the Reagan Administration's Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI) which is, in part, a trade and investment incentive
package approved by Congress in July 1983.8
Against this background, this Article will analyze the foreign invest-
ment laws of two particular countries - Mexico and Cuba. It first dis-
cusses whether and how each country is balancing the need to attract
foreign investors with its desire to maintain control over economic devel-
opment. Subsequently, the Article compares the goals and methods of
the foreign investment laws in these two countries with those reflected in
the CBI.
The laws of Mexico and Cuba were selected for both their similari-
ties and their differences. Due to geographic proximity, both countries
are in a position to maintain close economic ties with the United States.
Historically, Mexico has done so while maintaining a strong sense of eco-
nomic sovereignty. Cuba, on the other hand, has been economically iso-"
lated -from the United States since 1961. Despite this difference, both -.
countries have recently experienced serious foreign exchange problems,
both have had trouble meeting their debt repayment schedules, and both
are attempting to encourage direct foreign investment.9 Neither country
7. See, eg., Benitez, United States Investment in Latin America, 5 LAw. OF THE AM. 1
(1973). See also Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings on S.2237 Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1982) (statement of John R. Bolton, General
Counsel, Agency for International Development) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings].
8. Title II- Caribbean Basin Initiative, Pub. L No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CBI]. The Reagan Administration has also drafted a prototype bilateral invest-
ment treaty, a policy shift away from the United States traditional reliance on Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. It has been suggested that the Reagan Administra-
tion's emphasis on bilateral investment protection agreements reflects a belief that such instru-
ments can more effectively communicate to developing nations the elements of a stable
investment climate necessary to appeal to foreign investors in developing nations. Bergman,
Bilateral Investment Protection Treatie" An Examination of the Evolution and Significance of
the U.S. Prototype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL 1, 4 (1983).
9. In 1982, Cuba enacted Legislative Decree No. 50 on Economic Association Between
Cuba and Foreign Entities, reprinted in English in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1106 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as JVL]. In 1973, Mexico enacted the Law to Promote Mexican Investment
and Regulate Foreign Investment, Feb. 28, 1973, D.O. Mar. 9, 1973, reprinted in English in 2
DOING BUSINESS IN MEXico, app. 12 (Bancomer, S.A., Division Promocion Intemacional
trans. 1985) [hereinafter cited as FIL]. Mexico has also recently announced its National De-
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has been included in the CBI, although all of their neighbors in Central
America and most of the other Caribbean island nations are potential
beneficiaries. "
,f'he laws of these two countries can be viewed as model foreign in-
vestment laws passed by developing nations with a strong sense of na-
tional sovereignty vis-A-vis foreign investment. As such, they may be
seen as reflections of what similarly situated countries perceive to be the
optimal balance between direct foreign investment and economic auton-
omy. They also offer an opportunity to examine how this perception dif-
fers, or coincides, with what one major capital exporter, the United'
States, proposes as a solution for less independent developing nations
who seek progress through direct foreign investment.j
II. MEXICO
A. Background
Mexico's efforts to both control and encourage foreign investment
began with the Mexican Revolution in 1911. Porfirio Diaz, President of
Mexico at the time of the Revolution, believed that foreign investment
alone could secure economic prosperity."I His efforts to encourage for-
eign investment resulted in foreign control of key segments of the econ-
omy and foreign ownership of one-fourth of Mexican land. This
contributed to the deep dissatisfaction within Mexican society which fu-
eled the 1911 Revolution.
1 2
Mexico's Constitution reflects the attitude of the 1911 Revolution
toward foreign investment. It institutionalizes expropriation, declares
subsurface minerals to be the inalienable property of the state, and pro-
hibits foreign land ownership in border and coastal areas. I By 1940, the
Mexican government had nationalized the petroleum industry and the
railroads. Foreign investment had also dropped to nearly one-third of
velopment Plan 1983-1988, D.O. May 31, 1983, Second Section at 30 [hereinafter cited as
NDP], which affects foreign investment.
10. See CBI, supra note 8, § 212(b) for the list of countries which are eligible to be desig-
nated as beneficiary countries.
11. Schill, The Mexican and Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 437, 440 (1974) (citing Narwrite, The Financing of Economic Devel-
opment, in MExico's RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH 105 (E. Lopez ed. 1967)).
12. See H. WRITE, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO 53 (1971); Creel, Foreign Invest-
ment in Mexico: New Rules of the Game, in DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 9, at
15B-6 (1984).
13. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE Los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 27 (Mexico)




Since 1940, Mexican foreign investment policy has fluctuated be-
tween hospitality and restraint.' 5 In the early 1940's, Mexico embarked
on a policy of import substitution. In 1944, the government implemented
a formal policy of Mexicanization to protect budding domestic indus-
tries. Pursuant to this policy, certain industries were completely closed
to foreign ownership, while foreign ownership in others was limited to
forty-nine percent. 6 The government also began a deficit-financed pro-
gram of public investment in domestic infrastructure and strategic heavy
industries.' 7
In the latter part of the 1940's, the Mexican government grew
friendlier to direct foreign investment. Although not officially repealed
as state policy, Mexicanization was no longer vigorously pursued. For-
eign investment, mostly direct, continued to increase but with a notable
shift away from mining and infrastructure and into manufacturing, a less
politically sensitive area for foreign involvement. On the other hand, im-
port substitution continued through a system of import restrictions, local
content rules, and differential tariffs which encouraged foreign companies
to expand local production. These policies and trends continued until
the late 1950's.11
By that time, Mexico had a serious balance of payments problem
caused in part by the importation of capital goods, the repatriation of
profits from foreign investments, and falling agricultural surpluses avail-
able for export. In addition, domestic industrialists began to demand
protection from local subsidiaries of foreign firms in the manufacturing
sector.' 9 In response, the government placed new curbs on foreign enter-
prises. These curbs further restricted areas available for foreign invest-
ment, expanded the types of industries subject to Mexicanization,
imposed discriminatory taxation and government contracting policies
14. In 1926, foreign investment in Mexico was about 51.7 billion. By 1940. it was approxi-
mately S449 million. See Creel, supra note 12, at 15B-7, citing figures from Alfredo Navarrete,
El Financiamiento del Desarrollo Economico (Financing of Economic Development) Fondo de
Cultura Econoinica 1950, at 521 and BANCO DE MEXICO, CUADERNO SOBREt ,A INVERSION
EXTRANJERA DIREcTA: 1938-79 (Information Booklet on Foreign Investment).
15. See generally Grindle, Public Policy, Foreign Inesttment and Implementation Style in
Mexico, in ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: UNITFI) STATI:s-=LTIN AMFuRi-
CAN RELATIONS J. Dominguez ed. 1982).
16. Emergency Decree of June 29, 1944, art. 5 (Mexico), 145 D.O., No. 6, at 2 (1944)
(concerning regulation of foreign investment).
17. Frieden, supra note 1, at 413-15.
18. See Grindle, supra note 15, at 78.
19. See Schill, supra note 11, at 445; Frieden, supra note 1, at 416. See generally Domin-
guez, supra note 2, at 47.
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which favored domestic industry, and generally strengthened regulatory
control over new or expanded foreign investments.20
Simultaneous demands for continued economic growth tempered
these policies throughout the 1960's. Increasingly, however, the govern-
ment sought and preferred indirect foreign investment in the form of
bank loans and international bond issues. By the end of 1979, the Mexi-
can government reported an external debt of nearly $30 billion, primarily
owed to private sources. Government borrowing was channeled to both
state-owned and private domestic corporations. This maintained the
flow of foreign capital into the economy while allowing the government
to exert control over development and to preserve its political
legitimacy.21
As part of the general shift from direct to indirect foreign invest-
ment in the 1970's, Mexico passed the 1973 Law to Promote Mexican
Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment (FIL).22 The stated pur-
pose of the FIL was "to promote Mexican investment in order to stimu-
late a just and balanced development and consolidate the country's
economic independence." 23 President Echeverria assured the Mexican
Congress that the FIL did not reflect hostility toward foreign investment.
Rather, the underlying ideology was nationalist, with priority given to
Mexico's sovereignty. The law simply specified the conditions under
which Mexico welcomed foreign investment into the economy. The pri-
mary objectives, President Echeverria emphasized, were that foreign in-
vestment play a complementary role in the Mexican economy, that
foreign investment be associated on a minority basis with domestic capi-
tal, and that foreign investment be used to promote new industries rather
than acquire existing ones.24
President Echeverria's policies and highly critical rhetoric regarding
foreign investment undermined investor confidence in Mexico. Devalua-
tion of the peso in 1976 accelerated the decline in confidence. By the
time Echeverria's successor, Lopez Portillo, took office, the Mexican
economy was in serious trouble. In an attempt to improve the economy,
Portillo became more receptive to foreign investment. As part of this
shift, the government relaxed enforcement of the FIL. Nonetheless,
20. See Schill, supra note 11, at 446-48; Grindle, supra note 15, at 80-81.
21. See Frieden, supra note 1, at 416-18.
22. FIL, supra note 9.
23. Id. art. I.
24. See Creel, supra note 12, at 15B-12-13 (referring to the Presentation of the Federal
Executive's Reasons to Congress, requesting enactment of the FIL, published il INVERSION
EXTRANJERA Y TRANSFERENCIA DE TECNOLOGIA EN MExico 81 (Foreign Investment and
Technology Transfer in Mexico) (Asociacion Nacional de Abogados de Empresa ed. 1973)).
[Vol. 8
Foreign Investment Laws
Mexico's economic difficulties persisted throughout the Portillo
administration.25
When Miguel de la Madrid took office in December 1982, he ex-
pressed a desire for international cooperation. At the same time, he
noted that "revolutionary nationalism . .. imposes the obligation to
overcome everything that might damage [Mexico's] political or economic
independence.
26
On May 31, 1983, de la Madrid presented the National Develop-
ment Plan (NDP).2 ' The NDP provided that the FIL would be pre-
served. Nonetheless, the NDP expressed dissatisfaction with the
previous application of the FIL. Specifically, under the FIL no consis-
tent and systematic policy concerning foreign investment had been used
in decision-making nor had foreign investment been effectively oriented
to promote the technological developments necessary to generate the in-
creased import substitution and export production needed to improve the
foreign currency balance.28 The NDP indicated that, within the discre-
tion of the National Commission of Foreign Investment (the FIC), the
FIL would be interpreted and applied so as to promote these goals in the
future.29
Before analyzing the changes indicated by the NDP, the balance be-
tween encouragement and regulation of foreign investment struck by the
FIL must be examined.
B. Mexico's Foreign Investment Law
The FIL limits the extent of foreign participation in certain parts of
the economy and establishes the regulatory structure for monitoring and
making exceptions to these limitations.
The FIL defines foreign investors as all entities subject to foreign
control or interests.30 Obviously, this includes foreign corporations, as
well as individuals. The definition also includes those arrangements
which often conceal foreign control behind the facade of a domestic en-
terprise. These include: (1) Mexican business enterprises with majority
foreign capital or whose management is controlled by foreigners;3' (2)
25. See Grindle, supra note 15, at 82.
26. See Creel, supra note 12, at 15B-31-32 (quoting from the Inaugural Speech of Miguel
de la Madrid, Dec. 1, 1982).
27. NDP, supra note 9.
28. See Creel, supra note 12, at 15B-33.
29. The FIC is the regulatory body charged with administering the FIL It was estab-
lished by articles I 1 and 12 of the FIL, see supra note 9.
30. FIL, supra note 9, art. 2.
31. Under the Mexican Law on Business Corporations, a company must fulfill only two
19851
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foreign economic entities without legal personality;32 and (3) foreign im-
migrants when they are linked to foreign centers of economic control.33
The FIL relies heavily on the limitation of foreign-owned equity and
the control of management to guide foreign investment toward Mexican
development goals. As a general rule, foreign investment without prior
FIC authorization is limited to forty-nine percent of the capital stock in
newly formed Mexican businesses.34 Certain areas, however, are closed
entirely to foreign investors. These include extractive industries and in-
frastructure In others, foreign ownership is limited to a percentage
less than forty-nine percent. These include certain mining concessions,
petrochemical industries, and the automotive industry. 6
These limitations are not absolute. The FIC is empowered by Arti-
cle 5 to increase or reduce the allowed percentage of foreign participation
if it deems it in Mexico's interest to do so. This discretion has been used
to the advantage of all parties. For example, one hundred percent for-
eign ownership is allowed for maquiladoras industries. These are busi-
nesses which temporarily import merchandise or raw materials for
processing and immediate export. For Mexico the exemption contributes
requirements for Mexican nationality: It must be incorporated under Mexican law and it must
have a Mexican corporate domicile. Therefore, companies established prior to the enactment
of the FIL may have a Mexican shell while being entirely owned and controlled from abroad,
General Law on Business Corporations, D.O. Aug. 4, 1934.
32. "Foreign economic entities without legal personality" is a term of art which refers to
particular operations such as joint ventures, trusts, and pledges whereby foreigners control
Mexican companies without appearing as nominal shareholders. For example, a Mexican
company will often pledge some of its shares to a foreign bank to guarantee repayment of a
loan. The foreign bank then reserves voting rights over those shares and can exercise substan-
tial control. See Vizcaino, The Law on Foreign Investment, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 33, 36
(1977).
33. The status of inmigrado may be conferred on permanent residents after at least five
years of residence in Mexico. Even when immigrants are not connected with foreign entities,
they may not participate in areas of the economy reserved exclusively for Mexicans under the
FIC. This indicates an unwillingness to allow any party whose interests may not be fully
identified with Mexico to have control over sensitive areas of the economy. It also indicates an
unwillingness to rely on the regulatory system to detect disguised foreign control in this re-
gard. FIL, supra note 9, art. 5.
34. Id. art. 5.
35. Id. art. 4. Reserved for the state are: 1) oil and the other hydrocarbons; 2) basic
petrochemicals; 3) exploitation of radioactive minerals and generation of nuclear energy:
4) mining where restricted by specific legislation; 5) electricity; 6) railroads; 7) telegraphic and
wireless communications: and 8) other areas restricted by specific legislation. Reserved for
Mexican individuals or Mexican corporations with exclusion-of-foreigners clauses are: I) ra-
dio and television; 2) urban and inter-urban automotive transportation and federal highways
transport; 3) national air and maritime transportation; 4) exploitation of forestry resources-
5) gas distribution; and 6) other areas determined by specific legislation.
36. Id. art. 5.
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to a favorable trade balance, while the foreign investor takes advantage of
Mexico's lower wage scale.37
With regard to previously established businesses in Mexico, the gen-
eral rule requires FIC approval before a foreign investor may acquire
capital or fixed assets which would bring the total level of foreign invest-
ment in that enterprise to more than twenty-five percent of capital or
forty-nine percent of fixed assets. Leasing of the enterprise, or of assets
essential to its operations, is treated as an outright acquisition. Addition-
ally, FIC approval is necessary before a foreign investor may acquire the
management of any established enterprise.38
The loss of domestic control over Mexican business is tolerated only
when foreign investment is expected to provide benefits of increased em-
ployment, investment, and new technology which domestic capital can-
not supply. Foreign companies are highly concentrated in a few key
industrial enterprises. These foreign-owned enterprises often make
higher profits and grow more rapidly than national firms within the same
industries and are therefore able to squeeze out or acquire domestic com-
petitors. This trend has produced a progressive denationalization of key
manufacturing industries without generating any increase in overall em-
ployment or investment. It has also produced demands for protection
from threatened domestic entrepreneurs.39
To assure that approval of these foreign acquisitions is granted only
where domestic capital is unavailable, Articles 9 and 10 provide that the
FIC may grant Mexican investors a preferential option to buy shares in
existing Mexican companies or adopt any other measures to promote
Mexican acquisition. This policy is unfavorable to foreign investors,
tending to restrict such investors to new, riskier activities without the
corresponding promise of profits and market domination should the risk
prove successful.
Ownership restrictions are also applied when an industry initially
established with foreign capital expands. Article 12(IV) empowers the
FIC to regulate foreign investment participation in new fields of eco-
nomic activity or new product lines undertaken by existing companies.
This ensures that companies cannot avoid the original limitations on for-
eign participation by later changing their operations in Mexico. It is an
important precaution, given the tendency of foreign investment to shift
37. General Resolution 1, Empresas Maquiladoras (In-bond Companies), issued in parts.
June 7, 1973; Jan. 30, 1974; Feb. 27, 1974; Oct. 23, 1975; published in D.O. Nov. 5, 1975.
38. FIL, supra note 9, art. 8.
39. See Grindle, supra note 15, at 71.
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from less profitable fields to more dynamic and protected sectors. 40 It
also provides the basis, and the means, for on-going administrative super-
vision of foreign investors who must submit any expansion plan to the
FIC for approval of its capital structure.4 1
Mexico also limits land ownership in certain parts of the country.
Article 7 forbids foreign investors or Mexican companies which do not
have an exclusion-of-foreigners clause to acquire direct dominion over
land and water within one hundred kilometers from the Mexican border
or fifty kilometers from the coast. If the property is intended for indus-
trial or tourist activities, however, Article 18 provides that a domestic
credit institution may be authorized to acquire such property in trust for
use by foreign beneficiaries. These provisions allow Mexico to exploit
regions particularly attractive to foreign investors-the coast for its tour-
ism potential and the border for its access to United States markets-
without the political cost which the government would incur if it de-
parted from the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
areas long considered crucial to national security.
42
Historically, foreign investors have not viewed a minority position
in a domestic entity with favor. Today, majority ownership is considered
less important. Most investors realize that minority ownership does not
necessarily restrict management control. Recognizing this, the FIL spe-
cifically provides that the participation of foreigners in the administra-
tion of a new enterprise may not exceed foreign participation in capital.4 3
Similarly, with regard to established businesses, FIC approval is required
for management contracts or other means by which foreign investors
may acquire management control." The penalties for disguised owner-
ship or unauthorized management contracts are steep. Imprisonment of
up to nine years and fines of up to fifty thousand pesos are imposed on
anyone who avoids, or helps someone else avoid, the provisions of the
40. Wionczek, Mexican Natiopalism, Foreign Private Investment and Problems of Tech-
nology Transfer, in PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE DEVELOPING WORLDS 197 (P.
Ady ed. 1971).
41. As a general rule, the FIL has no retroactive application and contains no schedule of
divestiture. It has been suggested, however, that Article 12(IV) gives the FIC the statutory
option to force divestiture of companies established prior to passage of the FIL when they seek
to change their operations in Mexico. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that foreign
investor risk assessments with regard to the retroactive application of the FIL have been
played out in the 10 years since the passage of the FIL and therefore are not a factor to be
considered in determining how this law serves to attract foreign investment in 1984. See
Schill, supra note 11, at 471.
42. CONSTITUCION, supra note 13, art. 27.
43. FIL, supra note 9, art. 5.




The degree to which these provisions restrict foreign investors is un-
certain. Effective control can generally be exercised with a consolidated
forty-nine percent share of equity, especially when the remaining fifty-
one percent is divided among many uncoordinated domestic investors.
In addition, better access to financing, technology, and markets lends
considerable weight to the desires of a foreign minority. Furthermore,
monitoring the decision-making process is difficult and FIL enforcement
in this regard must necessarily depend heavily on voluntary
cooperation.46
Security in the form of control over investment decisions, the re-
trieval of invested capital, and the maintenance of a satisfactory return is
of primary concern to foreign investors. Most foreign investors derive
little comfort from the prospect of domestic forums for dispute resolution
when conflicts arise with respect to such matters. Yet Mexico has failed
to provide foreign investors with an international mechanism for dispute
resolution. Foreign investors are also prohibited from invoking the pro-
tection of their own governments with regard to properties acquired in
Mexico. Rather, under Article 3, foreign investors must consider them-
selves Mexican nationals. A violation of this provision may result in for-
feiture of such properties to the state.
Writing from the perspective of a United States investor, one ob-
server cites the absence of such an international mechanism as a substan-
tial disadvantage of investment in Mexico rather than in other
industrializing countries.47 The policy, however, is consistent with Mex-
45. Id. art. 31. In addition, foreign-owned shares must be nominal and registered with the
newly formed National Registry of Foreign Investment, as must any enterprise with foreign
ownership. See FIL arts. 23 and 25(IV). Because Mexican nationals can still hold bearer
shares, a common means of disguising foreign ownership is by employingprestanombres (name
lenders), Mexicans who hold bearer shares for foreigners.
46. Other laws attempt to deal with control leveraged through contracts providing tech-
nology to domestic enterprises. For example, the Law on the Registration of the Transfer of
Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks provides that acts,
agreements, and contracts covered by the Technology Law shall not be recorded as required to
be effective within Mexico if clauses are included which allow the supplier of technology to
regulate or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management of the acquisitor of technology.
Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Pat-
ents and Trademarks, Dec. 28, 1972, D.O. Dec. 30, 1972, art. 15(I) [hereinafter cited as the
Technology Law].
47. This same observer notes that there is also no Mexican-United States treaty basis for
Overseas Private Investment Corporation Insurance, another means of increasing investor se-
curity. Murphy, U.S. Trade and Investment in Mexico-An Overview of the Eightie., 12 LAW.
OF THE AM. 573, 578 (1980). See also Benitez, supra note 7, at 7 (regarding international
forums for dispute resolution).
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ico's credo of unqualified national sovereignty over the legal rights of
aliens.48 Mexico does not appear willing to compromise this for the sake
of investor security.
In another area important to investor security, however, the FIL
does compromise. It imposes no limitation on the repatriation of profits'
despite the adverse effects such repatriation can have on economic
growth and the balance of payments. 49 Such compromise, however, ap-
pears to be in Mexico's interest. Limitations on the repatriation of profits
would increase the risk of investment in Mexico, possibly causing many
investors to withdraw altogether. In contrast, a policy allowing repatria-
tion encourages initial investment and reinvestment by increasing inves-
tor's confidence in their ability to freely withdraw earnings for
investment elsewhere should a more attractive opportunity arise.
Key to understanding the FIL is an appreciation of the role played
by the FIC.50 As noted above, the FIC has broad discretion to authorize
any level of foreign participation in new, old, or expanding enterprises. "
In addition, it is empowered to issue resolutions, to establish criteria and
requirements for the application of foreign investment laws, and to act as
an entity of obligatory consultation on all foreign investment matters."2
The discretion of the FIC is guided by factors enumerated in Article
13. These factors reflect Mexico's basic goals regarding foreign invest-
ment. Foreign investment should complement national investment and
not displace national enterprises." It should have a positive effect on the
balance of payments, the level of exports, and the domestic content in-
cluded in domestically manufactured products.54 It should increase the
level of employment, the wage scale, and the training of Mexican techni-
cians and management personnel.5 5 Furthermore, foreign investment
48. CONSTITUCION, supra note 13, art. 27. See also Technology Law, supra note 46,
§ XIV.
49. Dominguez suggests that free repatriation of profits may reflect general support for
capitalistic enterprise which prevented domestic capitalists from supporting such limitations.
See Dominguez, supra note 2, at 471.
50. The FIC is composed of the Secretaries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Pub-
lie Credit, National Patrimony, Industry and Commerce, Labor and Social Welfare, and the
Presidency. FIL, supra note 9, art. 11. While the FIL has been explained as a mere codifica-
tion of previously existing policy, the FIC was intended to provide greater general direction
and control over foreign investment. Grindle, supra note 15, at 82.
51. FIL, supra note 9, arts. 5, 8, 12.
52. Id. art. 12.
53. Id. arts. 13(I), (II), (X).
54. Id. arts. 13(111), (VI).
55. Id. arts. 13(IV), (V).
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should contribute to the diversification of investment sources,5 6 to the
development of less economically advanced regions, 7 and to the supply
and development of technology within Mexico.58 It should have a posi-
tive effect on price levels and production quality. 59 Finally, it should
respect the country's social and cultural values, play an important role in
the country's economy and development objectives, and identify with the
country's interests.60
Although general in scope, these criteria give some direction in pre-
paring an investment plan for acceptance by the FIC. They are, there-
fore, marginally responsive to the foreign investors' call for clearly
articulated investment guidelines. The content of these guidelines, how-
ever, is not dictated by the concerns of foreign investors. The overall
tone indicates that foreign investment is welcome only if it promotes spe-
cific economic goals. Moreover, some of the considerations directly con-
tradict the interests of foreign investors. For example, the employment
of Mexican technicians and management can contribute to a loss of con-
trol over the enterprise; domestic content requirements may increase the
cost of production or decrease opportunities for favorable transfer pric-
ing; and the location of industries in less developed areas can increase
overall costs by requiring expenditures on infrastructure.
Although the Article 13 requirements appear rigid, these criteria are
completely discretionary. The FIC is free to overlook them in individual
cases where it is considered "in the national interest." This case-by-case
approach has been considered both the boon and the bane of the FIL. It
reduces predictability, thus increasing the risk of doing business in Mex-
ico. It also invites extensive bureaucratic intervention in the activities of
foreign investors.6"
In practice, however, the FIC has earned a reputation for pragma-
tism and flexibility in the exercise of its discretion. Intervention has often
evolved into a close working relationship, allowing the parties to bargain
for development objectives in exchange for profit opportunities. As a re-
sult, the FIL can take a strong nationalist position on paper, while giving
investors assurances of security and profits in practice.62
56. Id. arts. 13(VII), (VIII).
57. Id. art. 13(IX).
58. Id. art. 13(XII).
59. Id. art. 13(XIII).
60. Id. arts. 13(XIV), (XV), (XVI), (XVII).
61. See Little Has Changed Is Mexico's Message on Foreign Investnent, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, Feb. 29, 1984, at 65 [hereinafter cited as BUSINEss LATIN AMERICA]: Grindle,
supra note 15, at 83.
62. Many firms with foreign ownership have high-level Mexican officials sitting on their
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C. Current Foreign Investment Policy in Mexico
The National Development Plan indicates a change in tone rather
than in structure for foreign investment in Mexico. It preserves the FIL
as the basic legal framework but alters the way the FIC exercises its
discretion.63
The NDP appears to have two major objectives: first, to ensure that
foreign investment helps Mexico overcome its economic crisis by improv-
ing the foreign currency balance through efficient import substitution
and increased exports; and second, to ensure that foreign investment
helps Mexico recover growth capability primarily through effective trans-
fers of technology and management skills. To promote these objectives,
the NDP indicates that the FIC will no longer be as concerned with the
sheer magnitude of foreign investment. Rather, the investment's contri-
bution to national goals will be the central factor in the FIC's
consideration.6"
Depending on the situation, this strategy could mean either in-
creased leniency or increased restrictions with regard to foreign owner-
ship. Increased leniency is indicated by the NDP's only specific policy
innovation. The NDP suggests increased tolerance for foreign owner-
ship when the net effect of Mexicanization may be negative. Mexicaniza-
tion should occur only where actual control will be exercised by Mexican
shareholders and where the efforts of foreign investors to maintain profits
will not have unfavorable effects, especially with regard to transfer pric-
ing and technological decisions.65 This change should be a welcome one
for foreign investors. Though able to exercise control indirectly without
committing capital, direct equity control is both more convenient and
more effective in Mexico's relatively stable environment.
Another indication of leniency can be found in the guidelines issued
subsequent to the NDP. These guidelines provide that the FIC may au-
thorize majority foreign ownership, possibly up to one hundred percent
in certain industries, particularly those with substantial export and im-
port substitution potential. Authorization may also be given in those in-
dustries with high technology and capital requirements where suitable
boards of directors. This arrangement "serves to educate both sides on the realities of govern-
ment policies and operations as they relate to the needs of the business community." Grindle,
supra note 15, at 83.
63. NDP, supra note 9. See Creel, supra note 12, at 15B-33.
64. See Creel, supra note 12, at 15B-33.
65. Domestic capital which replaces foreign capital during Mexicanization is unavailable
for new investment projects. The increased equity does not always bring control and the for-
eign capital thus freed may leave the country permanently. See id. at 15B-35.
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domestic investors are unavailable.66 The guidelines also indicate that
approval may be obtained more easily for the expansion of established
companies into new activities or product lines using mostly foreign capi-
tal. Such approval, however, may still be conditioned on relocation to an
underdeveloped region in Mexico, plant modernization, increased ex-
ports or increased local content.67
In the area of joint ventures, however, the Mexican government is
considerably more reluctant to accept the loss of the Mexican control
which already exists. 68 When the Mexican partner cannot meet new cap-
ital requirements, all alternatives must be explored and proved inade-
quate before approval may be obtained for increased foreign capital.
Even after approval, the FIC may impose time limits for return to major-
ity Mexican ownership.69
Aside from issues of equity ownership, recent developments forecast
changes which do not necessarily favor foreign investors. Specifically,
the NDP indicates that the one hundred percent foreign-owned maqui-
ladoras industries may be subjected to increased domestic-content re-
quirements. This is designed to stimulate domestic industry and improve
the balance of payments. To attract foreign investors, however, the NDP
indicates that the government will authorize sales of maquiladoras goods
in the Mexican market.70 This is a definite relaxation of previous policy
66. Favored industries include non-electric machinery and equipment, high-powered eec-
tric machinery, high-technology metallurgy and microsmelting industries, electronic equip-
ment and accessories, heavy transportation equipment, chemicals, medical equipment,
photographic equipment, and other technologically advanced industries. BUSINEsS LATIN
AMERICA, supra note 61, at 66.
67. Id. at 66.
68. In 1982, the FIC issued General Resolution No. 19 which suggested the possibility or
debt capitalization to form joint ventures with foreign creditors even when such creditors
would hold majority equity. As Creel explains, Resolution 19 provides that Mexican compa-
nies indebted to foreign creditors could deposit an amount equivalent to their foreign currency
debt in pesos, in a special account with Mexican banks, which the Central Bank could convert
into foreign currency as soon as it became available. Mexican companies which took advan-
tage of such deposits might have the option to settle their debts through the creation ofjoint
ventures with the foreign creditors even if the foreign creditors thus become owners of more
than 49% of the capital stock of the Mexican corporation. Thejoint venture would be created
through the capitalization of the credit and through investment of the amount of the credit in
the opening of new establishments, relocation of the business, entering into new areas of activ-
ity, or starting new product-lines. Resolution 19 has been largely preempted by other mecha-
nisms for foreign debt settlement established by the de la Madrid administration. Creel, supra
note 12, at 15B-23. General Resolution 19, Criteria de Interpretacion del Articulo 13(XJ'I) de
la Ley para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Insersion Extranjera (Criteria for
Interpretation of FIL, Art. 13(XVII)). (Both are published at D.O. Oct. 1, 1982.)
69. BUSINEss LATIN AMERICA, supra note 61, at 66.
70. NDP, supra note 9, paras. 8.6.4.2.
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which had closed the local market to such goods in order to prevent
competition with domestic manufacturers. This trade-off reflects the cal-
culation that the benefit to these foreign investors will outweigh the bur-
den of increased domestic content rules, and as a result, Mexico will not
lose substantial investment. The political cost incurred by this policy
shift should be outweighed by the boost to certain supplier industries.
D. The Mexican Balance
The NDP and subsequent guidelines do not substantially alter the
FIL's investment structure. The centerpiece continues to be the forty-
nine percent equity limitation on foreign ownership. The exceptions to
that limitation continue to be conditioned on the factors specified in the
FIL. With its broad discretionary powers, the FIC can adjust its applica-
tion of Mexico's foreign investment laws and guidelines to suit Mexico's
changing investment climate and the demands of the Mexican public.
Mexico presently seeks increased foreign investment, particularly in
new areas. To attract such investment it has indicated a general willing-
ness to consider majority ownership." The assumption underlying this
strategy is that the increased opportunity for equity ownership will, in
and of itself, attract the desired new investment. Relative to other devel-
oping nations, Mexico is in a unique position to make this assumption. It
has a large, protected market with a relatively large, consumption-ori-
ented middle class. Geographically, it is well situated for access to mar-
kets in Central America, the Caribbean, and the United States. It has a
relatively well-developed infrastructure and its work force is considered
adaptable to an industrial setting. Furthermore, it has a long history of
investment which provides an incentive for foreign firms to remain in the
country. It also has a long history of relative political and economic sta-
bility. Finally, it has linked its unique profit opportunities with a policy
of free repatriation of earnings.72
It should be noted that this relaxed attitude does not imply an un-
guarded door. While Mexico is willing to forego ownership, it does not
appear willing to abdicate control over the impact of foreign investment.
71. The Executive Secretary of the FIC, Mr. Adolfo Hegewisch, has noted- "In addition
to the benefits of advanced technology and job creation that foreign investment brings with it,
said investment (if accepted) will imply an important source of outside financing with unques-
tionable advantages over the foreign debt." See Creel, supra note 12, at 1513-36 (quoting re-
marks by Mr. Hegewisch to the members of the Japanese Economic Community, June 13,
1983).
72. The NDP expressed displeasure at the out-flow of funds caused by remittance of prof-
its, but no specific proposal to limit the flow has been made. Id. at 1313-33.
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Foreign investment must still promote the national interest and the stress
is on expansion into new areas. In particular, the relaxed tone toward
Mexicanization frees domestic capital for such new investment and de-
creases the risk of losing foreign capital already contributing to the econ-
omy. Similarly, Mexico's reluctance to lose domestic ownership in
established joint ventures forces foreign capital into new areas.
If Mexico is something of a buyer in a buyer's market, Cuba is in
quite a different position. Yet, Cuba also appears unwilling to relinquish
control over the investment which crosses its borders.
I. CUBA
A. Background
Prior to the Cuban Revolution, Cuba's major source of foreign in-
vestment was the United States. The total amount is estimated at $956
million in 1960 - concentrated in key industries such as sugar, tobacco,
manufacturing, public utilities, and banking."3
Following the success of the Revolution in 1959, this situation
changed drastically. The Agrarian Reform Act, enacted on May 17,
1959, nationalized all large landholdings, including significant United
States interests. A series of expropriations began in October and Novem-
ber of 1959 and continued until substantially all means of production,
transportation, distribution, and communication had been nationalized.
By 1981, the central government controlled ninety-five percent of the
economy.
74
Before the Revolution, Cuba's major trading partner was also the
United States. 5 With the severance of diplomatic ties in 1961 and the
economic blockade of 1962, Cuba was abruptly weaned from this depen-
dency on the United States.76 Cuba has since reoriented its economy
toward the Eastern-bloc countries belonging to the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA). 7 It also continues to trade with West-
em nations. The level of this trade, however, varies with the price of
73. R. FONTAINE, ON NEGOTIATING WITH CUBA 21-23 (1975).
74. See Shneyer & Barta, The Legality of the U.S. Economic Blockade of Cuba Under
International Law, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 451, 459-60 (1981).
75. Seventy-five percent of Cuba's exports and sixty-five percent or its imports were in
trade between the two countries. See Theriot, supra note 6, at 107.
76. See 44 DEP'T STATE BULL 103-04 (1961) (announcing the severance of diplomatic
ties). See Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. § 157 (1962); Cuban Assets Control Regulations of
July 8, 1963, 3 C.F.R. § 515 (1980) (imposing the present economic blockade).
77. Trade with the CMEA is conducted largely on a barter system. See generally Theriot,
supra note 6.
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sugar, Cuba's major export, from a high of forty-four percent of Cuba's
overseas trade in 1975 to a low of seventeen percent in 1979.78
Throughout the 1970's and the early 1980's, Cuba has experienced
large trade deficits. These deficits have been caused by its failure to di-
versify its hard currency exports beyond sugar and its reliance on hard
currency countries for crucial imports.7 9 To meet its hard currency
shortfall, Cuba has borrowed an estimated $2.6 billion. Of that amount,
$1.7 billion is owed to Western commercial banks. 80
Continued borrowing to meet these continuing deficits is no longer a
desirable alternative for Cuba. The need to service its current debt is
contributing greatly to its hard currency problems and commercial banks
are becoming more reluctant to increase their exposure in Cuba through
further lending. 1
To add to Cuba's economic troubles, there is some uncertainty as to
whether the Soviet Union, which is faced with its own economic
problems and competing demands for aid, will continue to provide the
same high levels of aid to Cuba as it has in the past. This aid, adminis-
tered in part through trade subsidies, has enabled Cuba to avoid even
greater trade deficits and debt burdens.8" Cuba also faces severe unem-
ployment problems and public expectations of an improving standard of
living.83
Cuba urgently needs to increase its hard currency reserves while
promoting development which employs its population and satisfies public
expectations. Through the Cuban Joint Venture Law, Cuba is attempt-
ing to accomplish these goals by increased foreign investment from capi-
talist countries.
78. Zorn & Mayerson, Cuba's Joint Venture Law: New Rules for Foreign Investment, 21
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273, 284 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Zorn].
79. Imports from hard currency countries include chemicals, industrial inputs, machin-
ery, technology, and consumer goods unavailable from CMEA countries. Sugar provides 83%
of Cuba's global exports. Theriot, supra note 6, at 108. See generally Schmidt, Recent Devel,
opment, Foreign Investment in Cuba: A Preliminary Analysis of Cuba's New Joint Venture
Law, 15 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 689 (1983).
80. See Theriot, supra note 6, at 108-09.
81. Id.
82. The Soviet Union supplies Cuba with 98% of its oil needs (three-fourths of its total
energy needs) at approximately one-third the OPEC price. The Soviet Union also purchases
Cuban sugar (55% of Cuban exports in 1979) at what has at times been five times the world
price. In addition, the Soviet Union has made some hard currency purchases of sugar at world
prices totaling about $970 million over the 1975-1979 period. The hard currency cost of sup-
porting Cuba has increased due to foregone hard currency earnings as a result of tile oil price
rise as well as direct hard currency outlays. Id. at 112-16.
83. Id. at 106.
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B. The Cuban Joint Venture Law
The stated purpose of the Cuban Joint Venture Law (JVL) is to pro-
mote economic associations with foreign entities that have access to the
financial resources, raw materials, technologies, and markets which Cuba
lacks and which are essential for Cuban development. 4 The law espe-
cially promotes development in export industries and tourism.85 Though
unstated, the ultimate goal reflected throughout the JVL is to increase
hard currency reserves.
Unlike the Mexican law, the JVL is mainly concerned with the busi-
ness form assumed by foreign capital. The law provides for joint ven-
tures between foreign corporations or individuals and a Cuban state
enterprise or other national organization.86 The venture may be organ-
ized as a corporation with nominal shares and Cuban nationality or it
may be organized as a partnership.
87
Foreign participation in the capital of the joint enterprise (though
not necessarily in that of a partnership) is limited to forty-nine percent.
Though greater participation may be authorized, one hundred percent
foreign ownership is not possible under any circumstances since a Cuban
entity must be a party.88
The joint venture is governed by a memorandum and articles of as-
sociation. With two exceptions, the parties are free to agree on the spe-
cific content of these documents, which regulate such matters as
corporate organization, shareholder rights, and required quorums." The
final agreement is subject to approval by a newly formed regulatory com-
mission (the Commission). The Commission has discretion to establish
additional conditions as prerequisites to approval of a venture on a case-
by-case basis.90
As to the two mandatory provisions, the first requires the venture to
guarantee Cuban management or co-management of the enterprise. The
requirement appears unrelated to the proportion of contributed Cuban
capital. It reflects Cuba's desire to maintain control over corporate activ-
ities within the country.9'
The impact of this requirement on the foreign investor is offset by
84. JVL, supra note 9, preamble, art. 1.
85. Id. Introductory Note.
86. Id. art. 1.
87. Id. arts. 7, 9.
88. Id arts. 5, 15.
89. Id. art. 8.
90. Id. arts. 1, 3.
91. Id. art. 8.
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other provisions of the JVL. Article 8 gives the parties discretion to es-
tablish voting percentages for decision-making at shareholder and board
meetings, ranging from a simple majority vote to a unanimous vote on
certain matters. This ensures that on important matters either party can
build veto power into the document regardless of its equity position. The
parties also have discretion to establish the powers and responsibilities of
the managing officers. Theoretically, the parties can restrict Cuban man-
agement with regard to certain matters so long as the Cuban party con-
tinues to manage or co-manage some part of the venture. Commission
approval, however, is unlikely if the joint venture agreement blatantly
circumvents the management clause.
The second mandatory provision requires each party to guarantee a
market for the products or services of the joint enterprise. 92 This re-
quirement reflects Cuba's interest in expanding its export markets and
the importance of accurate predictions and advanced planning in Cuba's
centralized economy. Furthermore, it lays the statutory foundation for
foreign investor responsibility in the case of an unsuccessful project. The
required market guarantee increases the overall risk for the foreign inves-
tor, who may only be able to satisfy the requirement through long-term
contracts entered into prior to the joint venture. Questions of liability
should the final product not meet the quality stipulations of these long-
term contracts or in case guaranteed markets become unavailable are not
answered by the JVL. The actual effect of this requirement on foreign
investment will depend on the flexibility with which it is administered.
The JVL makes significant distinctions between joint ventures or-
ganized as corporations and those organized as partnerships. The two
mandatory provisions discussed above, as well as the forty-nine percent
limitation on foreign equity, do not apply to partnerships.9" Under the
law, a partnership can consist entirely of foreign capital without Cuban
management and without the prerequisite need to guarantee markets.
Article 9 specifically addresses partnership contracts without mention of
market guarantees or Cuban management. Therefore, this difference is
probably intentional and meant as an option to attract particularly desir-
able investors. Whether the difference in capital limitations is also inten-
tional is unclear as the Commission can exercise its discretion to allow
increased foreign participation in joint ventures.1
4
Capital contributions to joint ventures may be made in cash or other
92. Id.
93. Id. arts. 9, 15.
94. Id. art. 15.
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assets including the temporary usufruct of land, structures, or raw mater-
ials.9" Presumably these latter assets would form a large part of Cuba's
capital contributions since the joint venture may never own land, produc-
tive facilities, or natural resources in Cuba. In this way, Cuba need not
relinquish sovereignty over its land, productive facilities, and natural re-
sources claimed at the time of the Revolution.
The provisions governing capital contributions also indicate that
Cuba need not make any currency contribution to the joint venture. The
foreign investor may be required to make all initial cash outlays. This
not only increases the foreign investor's out-of-pocket costs but also its
risk exposure. Cuba, however, conserves scarce currency.
Two other provisions intended to increase Cuba's currency reserves
have the same effect on foreign investors as the capital contribution pro-
vision. Under Article 16, the Commission may require the prospective
foreign partner to furnish an adequate guarantee of its capital contribu-
tion at the time a joint venture proposal is submitted for approval. Any
cash guarantee will draw the "going rate of interest" in the interim
before approval. Under Article 22, the Commission may also require a
contingency reserve fund. The Commission has discretion over the size
of this fund. Until the size of this fund and the going rate of interest are
established, their effect on the foreign investor is uncertain. Given
Cuba's desire to increase currency reserves, however, the required
amount is likely to be more than nominal. In any event, the foreign in-
vestor loses control over any capital used to furnish such guarantee or
contingency reserve fund, thereby incurring opportunity costs which in-
crease the overall cost of Cuban investment.
Further provisions intended to increase Cuba's hard currency
reserves require that all financial transactions be conducted in freely con-
vertible currency measured by the National Bank of Cuba's official rate
of exchange.96 The parties must maintain freely convertible accounts in
Cuban banks and loans to joint ventures must be made in hard cur-
rency.97 The extent to which these provisions disadvantage the foreign
investor will depend on how Cuban currency is valued at the official rate
of exchange relative to the market rate. If the official rate overvalues
Cuban currency relative to the market rate, the provisions will increase
the cost of investment and the requisite profit needed to induce entry.
The commercial regulations of the JVL encourage import substitu-
95. Id. art. 14.
96. Id arts. 14, 20.
97. Id. arts. 19, 21.
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tion and export industries. With one exception discussed below, however,
they neither restrict nor encourage foreign investment in particular
industries.
Cuba's interest in an improved trade balance is reflected in Articles
31 and 32. While Article 31 gives joint ventures the right to export their
products and to import what they need directly, this freedom is limited
by Article 32 which gives Cuban state enterprises a first option to supply
the joint venture with such things as fuel, raw materials, equipment, ship-
ping and insurance services.98 This encourages the development of local
supplier industries and reflects Cuba's desire to promote import substitu-
tion. Article 32 also gives Cuban state enterprises first option to
purchase the finished product, which likewise encourages import substi-
tution with regard to consumer goods.99
Cuba favors the promotion of export industries over import substi-
tution where the two policies conflict. To exercise its option to either
supply or purchase, the Cuban state enterprise must offer internationally
competitive prices and meet other conditions." More generally, Article
32 states that it does not prejudice Article 31's freedom to export and
import. Theoretically, these limitations assure that Cuban exports re-
main internationally competitive, that Cuba does not forego unduly large
amounts of hard currency earnings from domestic sales, and that foreign
investors are not compelled to accept inferior or high-priced inputs or to
sell domestically below market price. It has been observed, however,
that there is much room for discretion and argument in determining
what a joint venture "needs" to import under Article 31 and what is
"internationally competitive" under Article 32.101
Tourism is the only area where the JVL especially encourages in-
vestment. Special provisions provide that investments in tourism may be
exempt from taxes, tariffs, and assessments. Special work regulations
may apply. Tourist areas may be declared duty-free zones where tourists
can spend their own hard currency. In addition, land, hotels, and other
installations may be leased directly to the foreign investor, as opposed to
the joint venture."0 2
Although Cuba's landscape is one of its few clearly lucrative natural
resources with which to attract foreign investors, tourism in Cuba is also
associated with social problems such as gambling and prostitution. For
98. I. art. 32(a), (c) and art. 18 (with regard to insurance).
99. Id. art. 32(b).
100. Id. art. 32.
101. Zorn, supra note 78, at 292-93.
102. JVL, supra note 9, First and Second Special Provisions.
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this reason, Cuba plans to establish isolated areas, keys and small islands,
for tourism." 3 This will enable Cuba to derive the economic benefits of
tourism while minimizing the domestic friction it creates.',t
Aside from its hard currency problems, Cuba is also concerned with
increasing employment in a labor force considered overtrained for the
available jobs.'05 The JVL's labor regulations reflect this concern. Joint
ventures must employ Cubans in all but certain managerial and techni-
cally specialized positions. 0 6 They are not required to provide education
or training. The absence of a training provision is a marked difference
between Cuba's investment laws and those of other developing
nations.107
Cuba's desire to maintain control over foreign investment extends to
the Cubans employed by the joint venture. Under the JVL, Cuban em-
ployees maintain contractual relations with a Cuban entity which may or
may not be a party to the joint venture. o0 With exceptions for Cuban
managerial personnel, Cuban employees are paid wages fixed by general
legislation which establishes wages for other Cubans. 3 9 The joint ven-
ture pays the hard currency equivalent to the Cuban entity."10 This ar-
rangement serves a dual function for Cuba. It prevents the friction
which might result if employees of joint ventures were treated differently
from other Cuban workers and it ensures that Cuba receives the hard
currency equivalent of the wages paid. The foreign investor loses direct
control over employees but receives in exchange the benefit of low Cuban
wages. " '
In addition to the labor provisions discussed above, the joint enter-
prise must establish an economic incentive fund for employees. ' 2 Cuba
has used similar funds in the past to satisfy public demand for certain
social services." 3 The size of the fund is left to the Commission's discre-
103. See Zorn, supra note 78, at 291.
104. Tourism has contributed nearly S80 million in hard currency annually to the econ-
omy. See Schmidt, supra note 79, at 704.
105. See Zorn, supra note 78, at 294; Theriot, supra note 6.
106. JVL, supra note 9, art. 36.
107. See eg., Mexico's FIL, supra note 9, art. 13(V). The FIC shall consider the employ-
ment and training of Mexicans as a factor in authorizing investment.
108. JVL, supra note 9, art. 38.
109. The wages of Cuban management personnel are subject to negotiation by the parties
to the joint venture and must be in accord with salaries or foreign managers. Id. art. 41.
110. IL art. 37.
111. Cuban wages are low in part because the government provides health and education
benefits and limits rent to 10% of a household income. See Zorn, supra note 78. at 294-95.
112. JVL, supra note 9, art. 42.
113. See Schmidt, supra note 79, at 704.
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tion. Similar funds have been based on enterprise profitability. The am-
biguity of this provision introduces an additional element of uncertainty
for the foreign investor.
Cuban control is also manifested in several other JVL provisions.
For example, dispute settlement procedures under the JVL vary depend-
ing on the parties involved. For disputes arising among the joint ventur-
ers themselves, settlement procedures may be specified in the corporate
documents.' 14 Presumably, these documents could provide for a forum
in a neutral state or in the foreign investor's state. Although this ar-
rangement would be preferable to foreign investors, some observers
doubt that it would receive Commission approval.
1 5
When disputes arise between a joint venture and Cuban state enter-
prises, no choice of forum is possible. These disputes must be submitted
to the Cuban State Arbitration System." 6 Cuba is unwilling to relin-
quish its sovereignty over these disputes even when it acts as a commer-
cial party. Since foreign investors may have serious reservations about
Cuba's ability to provide a fair hearing when it is both party and judge,
this is likely to have a negative effect on foreign investment.
Provisions allowing repatriation of dividends and profits are more
favorable to the foreign investor. Article 23 guarantees free transferabil-
ity in convertible currency. The less generous provisions of Article 44,
on the other hand, allow foreign personnel to remit abroad in convertible
currency only a percentage of their salaries as determined by the Na-
tional Bank of Cuba. Both provisions are, nonetheless, concessions to
promote foreign investment. One may assume that Cuba would prefer
reinvestment to this drain on its foreign exchange reserves.
Expropriations are clearly another area of primary concern to for-
eign investors, given Cuba's history. The JVL provides weak reassur-
ance. Under Article 24, the National Bank of Cuba may guarantee
repatriation of the foreign investor's share in the joint venture should
Cuba "take unilateral action suspending the economic association."
Cuba's assertion of its right to expropriate foreign ventures is implicit in
Article 24. This alone may be sufficiently troubling to foreign investors,
regardless of the possibility of compensation. Furthermore, the provision
suggests only the possibility of compensation-it is not a guarantee.
Article 24 is consistent with the prevailing Third World attitude
concerning expropriations. In fact, by allowing the possibility of com-
114. JVL, supra note 9, art. 13.
115. See Zorn, supra note 78, at 302.
116. JVL, supra note 9, art. 35.
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pensation, it is somewhat more liberal than the norm. It also tempers the
threat of expropriation by guaranteeing that the duration of the joint ven-
ture will be long enough to enable the parties to recover their investment
and obtain returns that make the undertaking "attractive.""' 7 Nonethe-
less, given the events following the Cuban Revolution, some investors
may want stronger assurances of the safety of their investment. It is un-
clear to what extent this will affect investors from countries unaffected by
the events of the early 1960's.
C. The Cuban Balance
The possibility of private foreign ownership, in itself, is the most
significant concession Cuba has made to encourage foreign investment.
The appearance of ownership is desirable for many foreign investors re-
gardless of the real control or security it brings. Satisfying this desire
represents a departure from Cuba's ideological position against private
ownership in general, and foreign ownership in particular.
The concession toward foreign ownership is not without limits. As
a general rule, the foreign investor must be a junior partner to the state.
Many foreign investors see this status as a serious limitation, especially in
view of the fact that their mandatory partner is a state enterprise.
Though the state partner is a profit-seeking entity, high profits alone will
not satisfy Cuba's development goals. These goals may motivate the
state party to act in ways which will not maximize profits for the junior
partner. Furthermore, the law requires Cubans to manage or co-manage
the enterprise irrespective of their equity position. Through negotiations,
the foreign investor may be able to mitigate this limitation, but the requi-
site Commission approval of any agreement will reduce this flexibility.
Though Cuba requires Cuban control over the joint venture, it also
recognizes the importance of security for foreign investors and has made
some concessions in this regard as well. The mere existence of a law
delimiting the powers and obligations of all parties increases investor se-
curity. Specific provisions also address this issue. The law provides for
free repatriation of profits. And while it does not insure against expro-
priation, it allows the possibility of compensation should expropriation
occur and guarantees that the duration of the project will allow a worth-
while return on investment. Finally, the law guarantees that the joint
venture will not have to accept supplies or sell its products at prices
which are not internationally competitive.
In other areas, Cuba has been unwilling to make concessions. It
117. Iad art. 4.
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retains its right to take unilateral actions suspending the operations of
the joint venture. Likewise, it insists on its own forum with regard to
dispute settlements when a state enterprise is a disputant.
Furthermore, the financial regulations of the law promote Cuba's
strong interests in improved currency reserves with little regard to for-
eign investors' concerns about risk exposure. The foreign investor must
accept Cuba's official rate of exchange for hard currency. It may also be
required to make all the initial capital outlays and establish a contigency
fund. Presumably, the size of the contingency fund, as well as the em-
ployee incentive fund, may be negotiated before a joint venture is estab-
lished. This gives the foreign investor some opportunity to reduce this
disadvantage, but the flexibility of the Commission in this regard is yet to
be seen.
On paper, the JVL promotes Cuba's development and foreign ex-
change goals with only three major concessions: ownership, free repatri-
ation of earnings, and the requirement of internationally competitive
prices before a joint venture must buy or sell domestically. The Commis-
sion is granted considerable discretion in administering the law. It is too
early to determine how this will effect the JVL in practice.
D. Summary-Mexico and Cuba
The foreign investment laws of Mexico and Cuba share similar pur-
poses. Both are designed to promote industrialization and to increase
hard currency earnings. The laws are not identical, however. The points
of divergence reflect the different ideological positions of the two coun-
tries and the different domestic pressures each faces.
Both Mexico and Cuba as a general rule limit foreign ownership in
joint enterprises to a minority position." 18 Their regulatory bodies have
broad discretion to depart from that rule."9 Mexico specifies the factors
to be considered in the exercise of this discretion. 2
0 Cuba does not. 12 1
This difference reflects Mexico's more extensive experience with foreign
investment and its need to assure politically powerful domestic groups
that the FIC exercises its discretion in a manner that protects both their
interests and those of the nation. It also reflects Mexico's stronger posi-
tion vis-A-vis foreign investors, and its ability to state from the outset
where and under what conditions foreign investment is welcome, Ironi-
118. See supra notes 34-36, 88 and accompanying text.





cally, delineation of these limitations increases the security with which
foreign investors can plan their activities. This in turn makes Mexico a
more attractive prospect for foreign investment, which places it in an
even stronger position with respect to foreign investors.
Mexico and Cuba attempt to retain control over foreign investments
in ways other than equity limitations. Both countries rely heavily on the
discretion exercised by their regulatory bodies to maintain control. Cuba
requires Cuban management or co-management of joint ventures regard-
less of ownership. 122 Mexico prohibits foreign management contracts
and limits participation in corporate administration to an amount pro-
portional with equity.'23
Mexico tries to channel foreign investment into specific industries by
incorporating certain factors into the FIC's considerations and applying
discriminatory laws and regulations.' 24 Foreign investment is banned
altogether in some areas.'25 Cuba specifically encourages investment in
the tourism industry but does not explicitly limit investment in other
areas.' 2 6 This may reflect Mexico's relatively advanced industrial status
which allows greater autonomy in running its own industries.
Both countries are interested in increased import substitution. Mex-
ico promotes this goal by making it a specific factor for consideration by
the FIC in controlling foreign investments. 12 In certain industries, Mex-
ico also requires domestic content quotas supported by high tariffs and
other import barriers. 128 In contrast, Cuba limits itself by requiring in-
ternationally competitive prices as a basis for exercising its option to sup-
ply.'29 This reflects Cuba's weaker position in relation to foreign
investors as well as its overriding need to generate increased exports.
On questions of investor security, Mexico and Cuba take similar po-
sitions. Both insist on a domestic forum for dispute resolution.' "
Neither guarantees against expropriations or similar actions. These is-
sues have been hard fought in international forums. Though still a ques-
tion of much debate and extreme interest for foreign investors, Mexico
and Cuba appear to be on the winning sides. 131 With respect to repatria-
122. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 47-48, 114-16 and accompanying text.
131. Third World nations have challenged the underlying merits of foreign investment and
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tion, however, the interests of foreign investors have prevailed. Each
country allows free repatriation of profits, though both would benefit
from reinvestment of those profits.
Mexico and Cuba have made compromises, often similar ones, in an
effort to attract foreign investment while promoting domestic develop-
ment. This Article now examines how and to what extent their resulting
investment regimes differ from that suggested by the United States, as a
major capital exporter, for other developing nations in the same area.
IV. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
A. Background and Purpose
In July of 1983, Congress approved a portion of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) originally announced by President Reagan in March
1982.132 Public Law 98-67 allows certain products exported from eligible
Caribbean nations duty-free entry into the United States. It also allows
tax deductions for the costs of attending business conventions in those
same eligible countries.
1 33
As explained in the House Report, the CBI is a response to the eco-
nomic crisis and the consequent threat of political and social instability
facing Caribbean nations.134 Deep-rooted structural problems, high un-
employment, declining growth, and enormous balance-of-payment defi-
cits are cited as some of the causes of this economic crisis. 3" Supporters
of the CBI argue that it provides an incentive for eligible nations to over-
come these problems through self-help and the development of new in-
dustries. 36 Critics claim that United States motives are not so selfless.
Rather, they argue that the CBI primarily assists United States busi-
nesses in the region by coercing favorable policies from the eligible
the international standards protecting it on numerous occasions in international forums. See,
e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A.
Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
132. CBI, supra note 8.
133. Id.
134. H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REI. No.
266].
135. Id.
136. When President Reagan submitted the original CBI to Congress, he said: "A key
principle of the program is to encourage a more productive, competitive and dynamic private
sector, and thereby provide the jobs, goods and services which the people of the Basin need for
a better life for themselves and their children. All the elements of this program are designed to
help establish the conditions under which a free and competitive private sector can flourish."
President's Message to Congress on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs.
Doc. 323, 326 (Mar. 22, 1982). See also Cong. Q., June 25, 1983, at 1289 (quoting Sam




The CBI's success or failure rests primarily on local and foreign pri-
vate sector initiative.138 Spokespersons for the Reagan Administration
have made it clear that past policies of governments in the area have
hampered that initiative and contributed significantly to the current cri-
sis.139 Whether eligible countries will be named beneficiaries under the
CBI will depend on their willingness to change these policies and to cre-
ate an atmosphere conducive to investment.140
B. The Provisions of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
The relevant provisions of the CBI can be divided into two catego-
ries: prerequisites for becoming a beneficiary country and provisions
governing duty-free treatment of exports and business conventions for
beneficiary countries.
Countries eligible for beneficiary status include all nations in Central
America and most Caribbean nations with Cuba as the notable excep-
tion.14 1 The CBI imposes two further limitations on eligibility for such
status which are germane to this Article. First, no country shall be a
beneficiary if it has taken any action nationalizing, expropriating, or
otherwise seizing ownership or control of property owned by a United
States citizen or an entity which is fifty percent or more beneficially
owned by United States citizens.1 42 Such actions include the repudiation
or nullification of an existing contract, agreement, patent, trademark or
137. Zorn & Mayerson, The Caribbean Basin Initiatihw A Vindfall for the Primate Sector
14 LAW. OF THE AM. 523, 524 (1983).
138. H.R. REP. No. 266, supra note 134, at 3.
139. See The Caribbean Basin Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American
Affairs oftheHouse Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 134-79 (1981) (statements
of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, at 134; Stephen
L. Lande, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Bilateral Affairs, at 146; and John R. Bol-
ton, General Counsel, Agency for International Development, at 155) [hereinafter cited as
1981 Hearings].
140. John R. Bolton, General Counsel, Agency for International Development, testified:
Fast-disbursing assistance provided by the United States and the rest of the donor
community, however, is only part of what is needed. Even more important is what
the Caribbean Basin countries can do for themselves through sound economic poli-
cies that both encourage private-sector production and increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of public-sector programs. That is why U.S. assistance will be concen-
trated in those countries that demonstrate a willingness to undertake serious eco-
nomic policy reforms. . . . As I indicated earlier, economic assistance will be
concentrated on those countries that are making a determined effort to revitalize
their economies through appropriate policies, programs and projects.
Ild. at 156, 159.
141. CBI, supra note 8, § 212(b).
142. Id. § 212(b)(2).
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other intellectual property right and the imposition of taxes, exactions,
and restrictive maintenance or operational conditions."' 3
This restriction is not absolute. The President may grant beneficiary
status to a country that has expropriated property belonging to United
States citizens if he determines: 1) that prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation has been or is being made; 2) that good faith negotiations
or other measures to provide such compensation under applicable inter-
national law are in progress; or 3) that a dispute over compensation has
been submitted to arbitration under the International Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes or in another mutually agreed upon
forum. In addition, the President is given discretion to grant beneficiary
status regardless of whether any steps to effect compensation have been
taken if he deems it in the economic or security interests of the United
States to do so. 44
The second restriction provides that no country shall be a benefici-
ary if it fails to act in good faith in recognizing as binding, or in enforc-
ing, arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or entities which
are fifty percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens
when such awards are made by arbitrators to whom the parties have
submitted their dispute. This condition can also be waived if the Presi-
dent finds it in the national interest to do s0.14
5
In addition to these waivable restrictions, the CBI sets forth several
considerations which should influence the President's decision to desig-
nate a country as a beneficiary under the CBI. Several of these criteria
concern the economic policies of the eligible country. Of these, the first
is the strength of the country's assurance to the United States that it will
provide equitable and reasonable access to its markets and basic com-
modity resources."' 6 The second is the commitment of the country to
follow the accepted rules of international trade under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."' 7 The third is the degree to which
such country uses export subsidies, or imposes export performance and
local content requirements which distort international trade.1 48 The
fourth is the degree to which the trade policies of the country as they
relate to other countries contribute to the revitalization of the region. 149
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 212(b)(3).
146. Id. § 212(c)(3).
147. Id. § 212(c)(4).
148. Id. § 212(c)(5).
149. Id. § 212(c)(6).
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The final consideration is the willingness of the country to undertake self-
help measures which promote its economic development.
t5 0
Once a country is designated a beneficiary, it receives duty-free
treatment on certain articles. No article which has merely undergone
simple combining, packaging operations, or dilution is eligible. 5,' Items
specifically excluded from duty-free treatment by the CBI are textiles,
shoes, handbags, luggage, tuna, petroleum products, watches, and watch
parts. 52 Furthermore, the Secretary of the Treasury may require that a
duty-free article be wholly grown, produced or manufactured by a benefi-
ciary. 153 At a minimum, parts and labor from that country must contrib-
ute at least thirty-five percent to the appraised value of the exported
article. For purposes of this calculation, however, parts produced in the
United States may contribute to the thirty-five percent requirement up to
fifteen percent of the total value.'5 4 In effect, therefore, only twenty per-
cent of the value of an article need come from parts or labor contributed
by a beneficiary country. Furthermore, the labor costs which form part
of the thirty-five percent figure can include the cost of supervisory and
quality control personnel. 5 5 These jobs are often held by employees
from the foreign investor's country. The figure also includes the cost of
depreciation on machinery and equipment allocated to the specific
merchandise.' 56
The CBI abounds with escape clauses. The President may suspend
duty-free treatment under the CBI if such action is proclaimed pursuant
to either section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 or section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. "1 With regard to sugar, syrups, and molasses,
the President may, upon recommendation from the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, suspend the duty-free treatment without reference to previous trade
laws if such action is necessary to protect price supports for sugar beets
and sugar cane.'
58
In addition to duty-free treatment, the CBI provides that the cost of
150. Id. § 212(c)(7).
151. Id. § 213(a)(2)(A) & (B).
152. Id. § 213(b)(l)-(5). The excluded items accounted for almost S7 billion of the S8 bil-
lion worth of Caribbean goods imported by the United States in 1982. Because more than one-
half of the remaining goods already enter the nation duty-free, only an estimated SM0.000
worth of imports will be affected by the CBI duty-free provision. Cong. Q., June 25. 1983. at
1289.
153. CBI, supra note 8, § 213(a)(2).
154. Id. § 213(a)(l)(B).
155. Id. § 213(a)(3)(A).
156. Id. § 213(a)(3)(B).
157. Id. § 213(e)(1).
158. Id. § 213(d)(3).
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business conventions held in beneficiary countries can be deducted as or-
dinary and necessary expenses under section 274(h) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.'5 9 Previously, a deduction was allowed only for conventions
held within the United States, its possessions, Canada, Mexico, or the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. This is the only instance where the
CBI encourages a specific industry.
The CBI touches many areas of concern to developing countries,
especially issues of national sovereignty and the promotion of domestic
industries through import substitution controls and other regulatory
measures. The next section of this Article will discuss whether and how
the CBI's treatment of these issues differs from that of Mexico and Cuba.
C. Comparison: The CBI, Mexico's FIL and Cuba's JVL
The dichotomy between developed and developing nations on ques-
tions of national sovereignty is reflected in the contrasting provisions of
the CBI, on the one hand, and the Mexican and Cuban laws on the other.
These differences are apparent in three areas: 1) the legality of expropri-
ation; 2) appropriate compensation for expropriation; and 3) the appro-
priate choice of law and forum for dispute resolution.
The CBI provides that expropriation or nationalization per se will
generally prevent a country from achieving beneficiary status. Expropri-
ation is broadly defined to mean any action "the effect of which is to
nationalize, expropriate or otherwise seize ownership or control of prop-
erty."' 16 0 The compulsory sale of an investment, or the impairment or
deprivation of its management or control may constitute indirect "expro-
priations" under this definition.' 6 '
Both Mexican and Cuban law allow actions considered "expropria-
tions" under the CBI definition, actions which are important tools in the
implementation of each country's economic policy. While Mexican law is
silent concerning direct measures, Cuban law specifically allows for the
possibility of unilateral action by the Cuban state suspending the activi-
ties of a joint venture.' 62 With respect to actions which may be con-
sidered indirect expropriations, both countries require domestic
management to some degree. Under the Cuban law, the Commission
may require Cuban management which is disproportionate to Cuban eq-
159. Id. § 222.
160. Id. § 212(b)(2)(B).
161. The United States Prototype BIT uses words similar to those or the CBI to describe
expropriation and also gives the examples of indirect expropriation mentioned in the test, See
Bergman, supra note 8, at 21.
162. JVL, supra note 9, art. 24.
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uity.'63 If the management provisions are settled before ajoint venture is
established, this may not be considered expropriation under the CBI.
Later changes in management structure, however, may be considered ex-
propriation. Under Mexican law, the FIC can specifically disallow an
existing management contract or other device giving foreign investors
management control.' Furthermore, Mexico's long time policy of
Mexicanization, or the forced sale of an investment, can be considered
"ccreeping" expropriation under the CBI. Article 8 of the FIL may give
the FIC statutory authorization to force Mexicanization when an estab-
lished company seeks to expand. Finally, Mexico's stringent regulation
of specific industries such as the pharmaceutical or automotive industries
has often been considered tantamount to nationalization.
65
Even if expropriation occurs, a nation may become a CBI benefici-
ary if it gives prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to the owner
in accord with international law. Although the United States asserts that
this standard of compensation is an international legal norm, it has been
rejected by the majority of nations. Third World opposition has been
voiced in international forums, most notably in General Assembly Reso-
lution 3171 which states that "each State is entitled to determine the
amount of possible compensation."'' 66 There are also significant practical
problems involved in applying a formula generally considered to mean
full market value where there is no competitive market for the assets in
question.167
Neither Cuba nor Mexico adopted the CBI compensation formula.
Mexico deals with the question on a case-by-case basis; the FIL gives no
specific guidelines for compensation. Cuba's JVL simply allows the for-
eign investor to repatriate "the share that corresponds to him" in case of
a unilateral action.1 68 The laws of both countries reserve for each as
much flexibility and discretion as possible.
Cuban and Mexican provisions concerning the appropriate forum
for dispute resolution regarding expropriation and other matters reflect a
similar desire to preserve flexibility, discretion, and national sovereignty
in matters of economic policy. As discussed above, Cuba requires that
disputes arising between the joint venture and a Cuban national organi-
163. JVL, supra note 9.
164. FIL, supra note 9.
165. Mexico Tips Its Hand with Drug Decree and the Cards Look Bad. BUsIN SS LyTiN
AMERICA, Mar. 7, 1984, at 73; Mexico Strips Down Auto Industry to Shore Up BOP, BUsINEsS
LATIN AMERICAN, Sept. 28, 1983, at 305.
166. G.A. Res. 3171, supra note 131.
167. See Bergman, supra note 8, at 39-41.
168. JVL, supra note 9, art. 24.
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zation be submitted to the State Arbitration System. 169 This restriction
to the State Arbitration System has great practical significance since
every joint enterprise must have a Cuban national organization as a part-
ner. Mexico also makes no allowance for submission of disputes to an
international forum. Rather, Mexico requires foreigners who acquire
property in Mexico to consider themselves to be Mexican citizens in re-
spect to that property.170 Implicit under both the FIL and the JVL is the
application of domestic law.
In contrast, the CBI refers only to international forums and interna-
tional law.171 Expropriation disputes must be settled under the applica-
ble provision of international law or submitted to arbitration under the
provisions of an international convention. 17 ' Host nations must abide by
the decisions of such arbitrators. In addition, the President is authorized
to consider the degree to which a country follows the rules of interna-
tional trade set forth in the GATT.
By requiring that beneficiary countries agree to follow international
law, the CBI ignores the developments of the last fifteen years with re-
gard to Third World assertions of sovereignty. From the point of view of
the Third World, the international law referred to by the CBI promotes
the interests of industrialized nations at the expense of the host's control
over its economic future. Both the Cuban and Mexican laws reflect this
point of view.
Moreover the CBI is not in agreement with Mexican and Cuban
laws concerning domestic policy tools to promote economic develop-
ment. The most general but potentially far-reaching factor upon which
the designation of a country as a CBI beneficiary country depends is the
extent to which such country provides equitable and reasonable access to
markets and basic commodity resources. What is equitable and reason-
able is subject to debate, but the United States has indicated that free
right of entry and national or most favored nation treatment will be the
standard. The degree to which foreign equity participation is permitted
may also be a part of this consideration. The CBI implicitly assumes the
possibility of majority foreign ownership in domestic companies and the
possibility of foreign companies operating domestically as well."1
3
These considerations and assumptions differ from the investment re-
169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
171. FIL, supra note 9, art. 3.
172. CBI, supra note 8.




gimes established by Mexico and Cuba. Both countries generally restrict
foreign equity participation to a minority position. Furthermore, they
limit the right of entry by requiring the approval of their respective ad-
ministrative bodies. Mexico's newly promulgated rules concerning the
pharmaceutical industry illustrate Mexico's willingness to discriminate in
favor of domestic manufacturers. These rules explicitly state that major-
ity Mexican-owned companies will be given preferential treatment in the
bureaucratic approval process, preferential financing for investments,
and favorable weighting in bidding for public sector sales. Permission to
manufacture raw materials is granted to foreign companies only if they
meet conditions not applicable to domestic companies. 74 In addition,
Mexico explicitly bars foreign investors from certain segments of the
economy. While it allows one hundred percent foreign ownership of the
maquiladoras industries, it has only recently begun to allow sales, limited
to twenty percent of the output of maquiladoras products, in the local
market. ' 75 Furthermore, Mexico attempts to steer foreign investment
into less developed areas when deciding whether to approve a foreign
investment project.
The CBI also authorizes the President to consider the degree to
which a country imposes export performance requirements or local con-
tent requirements which distort international trade. What distorts inter-
national trade is subject to argument and is a matter about which the
President can exercise considerable discretion.
With regard to domestic input, the CBI indicates a willingness to
accept at least thirty-five percent domestic content, the minimum re-
quired for the duty-free treatment at the CBI. In reality, however, by
excluding inputs from the United States and its territories, and by includ-
ing depreciation costs and foreign labor costs in the calculation of domes-
tic content, domestic input can fall considerably lower.
Cuba does not specify a required domestic content, but it does give
itself first option to supply the joint venture.' 76 Although exercise of this
option is subject to Cuba's ability to offer internationally competitive
prices, that standard is malleable and may be used to impose a flat do-
mestic content requirement. Mexico has been more explicit. The FIC is
directed to consider the level at which domestic inputs are incorporated
in the manufacture of products. 77 Recent regulatory changes concern-
174. BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Mar. 7, 1984, supra note 165, at 73.
175. Mexico Eases Ruls for In-Bond to Spur Inwistment, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA. Sept.
14, 1983, at 289.
176. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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ing the maquiladoras industries condition access to the local market on
satisfaction of set local content requirements. Similarly, Mexico has re-
cently increased local content requirements for automobiles from the
current minimum level of fifty percent to sixty percent in 1987, and for
light trucks from sixty-five percent to seventy percent in 1985.178
With regard to export performance contracts, Cuba requires foreign
investors to guarantee markets for the products of joint ventures. 1' 9
Mexico considers a potential foreign investment's prospective impact on
exports in determining whether to grant a license.'8 Both provisions are
designed to improve the balance of payments and to ameliorate Mexico
and Cuba's pressing need for hard currency.
As reflected in the laws of Cuba and Mexico, export performance
and domestic content requirements are important tools used by develop-
ing countries to ensure that investments further national development
objectives. The level at which these requirements are considered harmful
or distortionary depends upon one's point of view and the purposes the
requirements are meant to serve. The danger is that the CBI minimum
level may in practice become a maximum level, far below that which
Mexico and Cuba consider necessary to promote domestic industries.
The CBI authorizes the President to consider whether a particular
country is undertaking self-help measures to promote its economic devel-
opment. From the CBI's point of view, "self-help" has come to mean
unfettered free enterprise and the abolition of host government regula-
tions. From Cuba's and Mexico's point of view, "self-help" may be the
domestic content requirements which would be considered distortionary
under the CBI. Critics have observed that such ambiguity may mask
what in practice will become firm requirements further restricting the
control exercised by beneficiary nations over foreign investment.8
V. CONCLUSION
Cuba and Mexico have drafted foreign investment laws which delin-
eate where they are willing to make compromises to attract foreign inves-
tors and where they are unwilling to sacrifice the control necessary to
ensure that foreign investments serve national interests. The laws of the
two countries indicate that both Mexico and Cuba consider extensive
governmental regulation necessary to ensure that foreign investment is
178. BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 28, 1983, supra note 165, at 306.
179. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
181. See Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 137, at 529.
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worthwhile. Despite serious economic problems, neither Mexico nor
Cuba see foreign investment per se as an unmitigated good. Though both
countries have to some extent addressed the security concerns of foreign
investors, their tacit assumption is that the profit opportunities offered to
foreign investors outweigh the increased risks posed by host nation
control.
In contrast, the CBI assumes that unregulated investment opportu-
nities are a prerequisite for development and will automatically bring
economic well-being. As a consequence, the CBI stresses the need for
increased foreign investor security and control. It encourages eligible na-
tions to adopt policies which are inconsistent with those adopted by
other developing countries in a stronger position to shape their foreign
investment policy.
The respective histories of Cuba and Mexico have shaped their view
that investment is desirable only if controlled to conform to domestic
ends. Theirs is part of the collective experience of Third World nations
which the CBI ignores. At some stage in the history of these Third
World nations, did unfetterd foreign investment give them a net benefit
which allowed them to develop to the point where foreign investment is
of value only if controlled? If so, then the question becomes whether the
countries which are eligible for CBI beneficiary status and which have
not yet gone through this stage can, with hindsight, avoid this stage in a
manner that will benefit both the Caribbean nations and the capital
exporters.
1985]

